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The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory 
regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with 
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21 Introduction
The role of the bank regulatory capital regime in the propagation of business
cycles has been the subject of much scrutiny since the introduction of the
Basel I regime in 1988. The adoption of the Basel II accord in 2004–which
involves using mark-to-market pricing rules and setting capital requirements
on the basis of asset quality rather than only on asset type–and more re-
cently the global ﬁn a n c i a lc r i s i st r i g g e r e db yt h ec o l l a p s eo ft h eU . S .s u b p r i m e
mortgage market have led to renewed focus by economists and policymakers
alike on the procyclical eﬀects of capital adequacy requirements. Indeed, it
has been argued that because of the backward-looking nature of its risk es-
timates (based on past loss experience) Basel II induces banks to hold too
little capital in economic upswings and too much during downturns. Thus,
it does not restrain lending suﬃciently in boom times, while it restrains it
too much during recessions.
In a recent contribution, Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009) argued that
much of the analytical and empirical work devoted to the analysis of cycli-
cality of regulatory capital regimes focuses largely on industrialized countries
a n dt h e r e f o r ed o e sn o ta c c o u n tf o rt h et y p eo fﬁnancial market imperfections
that middle-income developing countries face. These include the predom-
inance of banks in the ﬁnancial structure, severe asymmetric information
problems and a weak judiciary (which combine to encourage highly collat-
eralized lending), the absence of ﬁnancial safety nets, and a high degree of
exposure and vulnerability to domestic and external shocks. In such an envi-
ronment, capital buﬀers may play an important role by helping banks convey
a signal to depositors regarding their commitment to screening and monitor-
ing their borrowers; they may therefore raise deposits at a lower cost. This
analysis shares some similarities with Meh and Moran (2008), where banks
lack the incentive to monitor borrowers adequately, because monitoring is
privately costly and any resulting increase in the risk of loan portfolios is
mostly borne by investors (households). This moral hazard problem is mit-
igated when banks are well-capitalized and have a lot to lose from loan de-
fault. As a result, higher bank capital increases the ability to raise loanable
funds and facilitates bank lending. As shown by Agénor and Pereira da Silva
(2009), if capital requirements are binding, the introduction of this channel
i m p l i e st h a ti ng e n e r a l ,i tc a n n o tb ec o n c l u d e dap r i o r iwhether Basel II
is more procyclical than Basel I–in contrast to what a partial equilibrium
analysis would imply.
3Despite its intuitive appeal, the model presented in Agénor and Pereira
da Silva (2009) is a static, nonoptimizing model. In this paper, we further
examine the cyclical eﬀects of capital adequacy requirements in the New
Keynesian model with credit market imperfections developed by Agénor and
Alper (2009). An appealing feature of that framework is its explicit focus
on the type of distortions (as described earlier) that characterize the ﬁnan-
cial structure in middle-income countries. It combines the cost and balance
sheet channels of monetary policy with an explicit analysis of the link be-
tween collateralizable wealth and bank pricing behavior.1 Because borrowers’
ability to repay is uncertain, banks issue only collateralized loans to reduce
incentives to default and mitigate moral hazard problems; they therefore in-
corporate a risk premium (which depends on the borrower’s net worth and
cyclical factors) in lending rates. At the prevailing lending rate, the supply
of funds by ﬁnancial intermediaries is perfectly elastic. Moreover, the central
bank ﬁxes a policy interest rate (the reﬁnance rate, which therefore repre-
sents the marginal cost of funds), using a Taylor-type rule and its supply
of liquidity to banks is perfectly elastic at the target interest rate. As a re-
sult, banks are unconstrained in their lending operations. Because changes
in central bank liquidity aﬀect the bond rate, changes in money supply play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in determining the dynamics of real variables.
Banks are also subject to risk-based capital requirements; in order to
compare Basel I-type and Basel II-type regimes, we assume that the risk
weight on loans to ﬁrms (the only risky asset for banks) is either constant
or a function of the repayment probability. This speciﬁcation is based on
the assumption that this probability is positively related to the (perceived)
quality of a loan. We determine the banks’ demand for capital, based on the
assumption that issuing liabilities is costly. This, together with the capital
regulation, causes deviations from the Modigliani-Miller framework.2 We also
assume that holding capital in excess of regulatory capital generates some
beneﬁts–it represents a signal that the bank’s ﬁnancial position is strong,
and reduces the intensity of regulatory scrutiny.
We incorporate a bank capital channel, but we do so in a diﬀerent (al-
beit complementary) manner than in Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009).
1In turn, the models in Agénor and Alper (2009) and Agénor and Pereira da Silva
(2009) build on the static framework with monopolistic banking and full price ﬂexibility
developed by Agénor and Montiel (2008).
2Without these assumptions, whether bank loans are ﬁnanced with deposits or debt
would be irrelevant. See Miller (1988) for instance.
4We assume here that holding capital induces banks to screen and monitor
borrowers more carefully.3 As a result, the repayment probability tends to
increase, which in turn leads to a lower cost of borrowing. Thus, bank capital
m a ya l s op l a yas i g n i ﬁcant cyclical role–the higher it is, the lower the lend-
ing rate, and the greater the expansionary eﬀect on activity. Although we do
not have (yet) strong evidence on this channel for middle-income countries,
it is consistent with the evidence for the United States reported in Hubbard
et al. (2002), which suggests that–controlling for information costs, loan
contract terms, and borrower risk–the capital position of individual banks
aﬀects negatively the interest rate at which their clients borrow, and in Cole-
man et al. (2002), who found that capital-constrained banks charge higher
spreads on their loans.
The main result of our simulations is that, contrary to intuition, a Basel
I I - t y p er e g i m em a yb eless procyclical than a Basel I-type regime, once credit
market imperfections and general equilibrium eﬀects are accounted for. In
our model, the repayment probability depends not only on the regulatory
regime (through the bank capital-loan ratio), but also on the cyclical po-
sition of the economy (which aﬀects cash ﬂows and proﬁtability) and the
collateral-loan ratio (which mitigates moral hazard). Following, say, a nega-
tive shock to output, a fall in the demand for production-related loans tends
to raise initially the collateral-loan ratio, which tends to increase the re-
payment probability. By contrast, the fall in cyclical output tends to lower
the repayment probability. Both of these (conﬂicting) eﬀects operate in the
same manner under either regulatory regime. If the cyclical output eﬀect
dominates the collateral-loan eﬀect on the repayment probability, and if the
fall in that probability is suﬃciently large, the Basel I-type regime mitigates
the procyclicality inherent to the behavior of the repayment probability–
because the cost of issuing equity falls as required capital falls; this in turn
lowers the lending rate. In addition, while the bank capital-loan ratio does
not change under a Basel I-type regime (given that risk weights are ﬁxed),
it may either increase or fall under a Basel II-type regime, because the risk
weight is now directly related to the repayment probability. If again the
cyclical output eﬀect dominates the collateral-loan eﬀect, so that the repay-
ment probability falls, this will also lead to a higher risk weight and larger
3Standard results suggest that a bank’s incentive to monitor does not depend on its
capital if it can completely diversify the risk in its loan portfolio. However, the inability
to fully diversify risk away is one of the key features of banking in developing countries.
5capital requirements–which will in turn tend to mitigate the initial drop
in the repayment probability. If this “bank capital channel” is suﬃciently
strong, the Basel II-type regime may be less procyclical than the Basel I-type
regime. Our numerical results suggest that this counterintuitive response can
be obtained with relatively small and plausible changes in the sensitivity of
the repayment probability to the bank capital-loan ratio.
The paper continues as follows. Section II presents the model. We keep
the presentation as brief as possible, given that many of its ingredients are
described at length in Agénor and Alper (2009); instead, we focus on how
the model presented here departs from that paper, especially with respect to
bank behavior and the regulatory capital regime. The equilibrium is char-
acterized in Section III and some key features of the log-linearized version
of the model are highlighted in Section IV. After a brief discussion of the
calibrated parameters, we present the results of our experiments: temporary,
negative supply and demand shocks, to highlight the implications of the two
regulatory regimes for the economy’s response to a recession. The last sec-
tion provides a summary of the main results and considers some possible
extensions of the analysis.
2 The Model
We consider a closed economy populated by ﬁve types of agents: a represen-
tative, inﬁnitely-lived household, intermediate goods-producing (IGP) ﬁrms,
a ﬁnal-good-producing ﬁrm (or, equivalently, a retailer), a commercial bank,
the government, and the central bank, which also regulates the bank. The
bank supplies credit to IGP ﬁrms to ﬁnance their short-term working capital
needs. Its supply of loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate.
To satisfy capital regulations, it issues shares at the beginning of time .I t
pays interest on household deposits and the liquidity that it borrows from
the central bank, and dividends on the shares that it issues. We assume that,
at the end of each period, the bank is liquidated and a new bank opens at the
beginning of the next. Thus, bank shares are redeemed at the end of each
period, all its proﬁts (including income from the redemption of one-period
government bonds) are distributed, and new equity is issued at the beginning
of the next period.4
4Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2005) also adopt the assumption of bank liqui-
dation in a two-period framework. Thus, there is no intrinsic distinction between issuing
6The maturity period of bank loans to IGP ﬁrms and the maturity period of
bank deposits by households is the same. In each period, loans are extended
prior to production and paid oﬀ at the end of the period, after the sale of
output. The household deposits funds in the bank prior to production and
collects them at the end of the period, after the goods market closes. The
central bank supplies liquidity elastically to the bank and sets its reﬁnance
rate in response to deviations of inﬂation from its target value and the growth
rate of output.
2.1 Household
The household consumes, holds ﬁnancial assets (including securities issued
by the bank), and supplies labor to IGP ﬁrms. It also owns the economy’s
stock of physical capital and rents it to IGP ﬁrms. The objective of the








1 − −1 +  ln(1 − +)+ ln+
)
 (1)
where  is the consumption bundle,  working time,  ac o m p o s i t ei n d e x




 ,w i t h

 denoting the number of
hours of labor provided to the intermediate-good producing ﬁrm ,a n d ∈
(01) the discount factor.  is the expectation operator conditional on
the information available in period , 0 is the constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption and   0.
The composite monetary asset is generated by combining real cash bal-
ances, 
 , and real bank deposits, , respectively (both at the beginning of







where  ∈ (01).
Nominal wealth of the household at the end of period , ,i sg i v e nb y
 = 

 +  + 

 +  + 

  (3)
equity or debt from the perspective of the bank; capital consists therefore, in the Basel
terminology, solely of “Tier 2” capital. See Yilmaz (2009) for instance for a partial equi-
librium model in which equity is accumulated over time.
7where  is the price of the ﬁnal good, 
 = 
 nominal cash holdings,
 =  nominal bank deposits, 
 holdings of one-period nominal gov-
ernment bonds,  the real stock of physical capital held by the household
at the beginning of period ,  the number of ownership shares issued by
the bank, and 
 the nominal share price. As noted earlier, equity shares
are redeemed at the end of each period; this is quite convenient analytically,
because it allows us to avoid distinguishing between equity stocks and ﬂows.
The household enters period  with  real units of physical capital and

−1 holdings of cash. It also collects principal plus interest on bank deposits
at the rate contracted in  − 1, (1 + 
−1)−1,w h e r e
 is the interest rate
on deposits, principal and interest payments on maturing government bonds,
(1 + 
−1)
−1,w h e r e
−1 is the bond rate prevailing at  − 1,a sw e l la st h e
value of redeemed shares and distributed dividends (1+
−1)−1,w h e r e
−1
is the nominal yield on equity shares.
At the beginning of the period, each household chooses the real levels
of cash, deposits, equity capital, and bonds, and supplies labor and capital
to intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms, for which it receives total real factor
payment 
  + ,w h e r e
 is the real rental price of capital and  =
 t h ee c o n o m y - w i d er e a lw a g e( w i t h denoting the nominal wage).





.5 In addition, it receives all the proﬁts of
the bank, 
 , which is liquidated at the end of the period. It also pays a
lump-sum tax, whose real value is . The household then purchases the ﬁnal
good for consumption and investment, in quantities  and , respectively.
Investment turns into capital available at the beginning of the next period,
+1.
Under certainty, the household’s end-of-period budget constraint is thus































where the last term represents transactions costs (measured in terms of the
price of the good) associated with changes in the stock of equity, with Θ  0
denoting the adjustment cost parameter.
5As noted below, the ﬁnal good-producing ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts.
8The stock of capital at the beginning of period  +1is given by








where  ∈ (01) is a constant rate of depreciation and the last term is a
capital adjustment cost function speciﬁed in standard fashion, with Θ  0
denoting the adjustment cost parameter.




 , ,a n d+1,t a k i n ga sg i v e np e r i o d -  − 1 variables as
well as , ,a n d.L e t+1 =( +1 − ) denote the inﬂation rate;






























































− Θ =0  (11)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint
and  = 







)=0  for  = 
 (12)
Equation (6) is the standard Euler equation. Equation (7) relates labor
supply positively to the real wage and negatively to consumption. Equation
(8) relates the real demand for cash positively with consumption and nega-
tively with the opportunity cost of holding money, measured by the interest
rate on government bonds. Similarly, equation (9) relates the real demand
9for deposits positively with consumption and the deposit rate, and negatively
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where the left-hand side is the expected real return on bonds (that is, the op-
portunity cost of one unit of capital), and the right-hand side is the expected
return on the last unit of physical capital invested (adjusted for adjustment
costs, incurred both in  and  +1 ). With Θ =0 , this expression takes the
simpler form [(1 + 
 )(1 + +1)] +  =1+
+1;p u td i ﬀerently, in the
absence of adjustment costs, the household simply accumulates capital to
equate the (expected) rental rate with the (expected) risk-free real interest
rate on bonds, plus depreciation.
Because (+1)=[(1 + +1)(1 + 













which shows that the demand for equity depends positively on its rate of
return and negatively on the bond rate. In the particular case where Θ →




2.2 Final Good Producer
The ﬁnal good, , is divided between private consumption, government con-
sumption, and investment. It is produced by assembling a continuum of








where 1 is the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The ﬁnal good-producing (FGP) ﬁrm sells its output to households at a
perfectly competitive price. Given the intermediate-goods prices  and the
ﬁnal-good price ,i tc h o o s e st h eq u a n t i t i e so fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s ,,t h a t
maximize its proﬁts. The maximization problem of the FGP ﬁrm is thus















− ∀ ∈ (01) (16)








2.3 Intermediate Good-Producing Firms
T h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fI G Pﬁrms, indexed by  ∈ (01).E a c hﬁrm produces
(using both labor and capital) a distinct, perishable good that is sold on a
monopolistically competitive market. Each ﬁrm must also borrow to pay
wages in advance, that is, before production and sales have taken place.
Price adjustment is subject to quadratic costs, as in Rotemberg (1982).






where  is labor hours,  ∈ (01),a n d a common technology shock,
which follows the following process
ln =  ln−1 + 

  (19)
where  ∈ (01) and 

 ∼ (0).
Each ﬁrm  borrows the amount 
 from the bank at the beginning of




 =  (20)
for all  ≥ 0. Repayment of loans occurs at the end of the period, at the
gross nominal rate (1 + 
 ),w h e r e
 is the lending rate charged to ﬁrm .












where  ≥ 0 is the adjustment cost parameter (or, equivalently, the degree
of price stickiness), ˜  =1+˜  is the gross steady-state inﬂation rate, and
 aggregate output, deﬁned in (15).
11IGP ﬁrms are competitive in factor markets. Unit cost minimization





















Each ﬁrm chooses a sequence of prices  so as to maximize the dis-
counted real value of all its current and future real proﬁts, where nominal
proﬁts at , Π
,a r ed e ﬁned as Π
 =  −  − 

.T a k i n g
{+ + +}∞
=0 as given, the ﬁrst-order condition for this maximiza-
tion problem is:
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which gives the adjustment process of the nominal price .
2.4 Commercial Bank
At the beginning of each period , the bank collects deposits  from the
household. Funds are used for loans to IGP ﬁrms, which use them to pay
labor in advance. Thus, lending, 








 =  (25)
where again  =
R 1
0 .
Upon receiving household deposits, and given its equity 
  and loans

 , the bank borrows from the central bank, 
 , to fund any shortfall in
deposits. At the end of the period, it repays the central bank, at the interest
rate 
 , which we refer to as the reﬁnance rate. It also holds required reserves
at the central bank, , and government bonds, 
 .





 +  =  + 











 denoting capital requirements and  
 excess capital. We assume in
what follows that, due to prohibitive penalty or reputational costs,  ≥  

at all times. In fact, we will focus on the case where capital requirements are
not strictly binding, that is,  
  0.6
Reserves held at the central bank do not pay interest. They are deter-
mined by:
 =  (28)
where  ∈ (01) is the reserve requirement ratio.
Using (28), and given that 
 and  are determined by private agents’
behavior, the balance sheet constraint (26) can be used to determine bor-







 − (1 − ) − 

  (29)
The bank is also subject to risk-based capital requirements; it must hold
an amount of equity that covers at least a given percentage of its loans,
exogenously set by the central bank. Government bonds bear no risk and
are subject to a zero weight in calculating capital requirements. The risk











where  ∈ (01) is the capital adequacy ratio. Under Basel I, 
 is ﬁxed at

0 ≤ 1; under Basel II, in a manner similar to Agénor and Pereira da Silva
(2009), we relate the risk weight to the repayment probability estimated by








6As documented in Pereira (2009), this is the more relevant case in practice.
7The Standardized Approach in Basel II can be modeled by making the risk weight a
function of the output gap, under the assumption that ratings are procyclical.
13where   0 and ˜  is the steady-state value of 
 . In the steady state, the
risk weight is therefore equal to unity.8
The bank sets both the deposit and lending rates to ﬁrms and the house-
hold, equity capital, and real holdings of government bonds, 
 = 
 ,s o





















 denotes current proﬁts at the end of period .9 In the present
setting (and given in particular the assumption that the bank is liquidated
and equity is redeemed at the end of each period), this maximization problem
boils down to a period-by-period problem.
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where  ∈ (01), , ,   0,a n d
 ∈ (01) is the repayment prob-
ability of IGP ﬁrms, assumed identical across them. The second term in





 , represents expected
repayment if there is no default. The third term represents what the bank
expects to earn in case of default. Under limited liability, earnings if the loan
is not paid back are given by the “eﬀective” value of collateral pledged by the
8In practice, the capital requirements prescribed by the Internal Ratings Based (IRB)
approach of Basel II are an increasing function of banks’ estimates of not only the prob-
ability of default, but also loss given default (LGD) of each loan–that is, the fraction of
exposure that will not be recovered following default. Here, given the presence of collat-
eral, the value of LGD for each individual IGP ﬁrm is in fact 
 − ; as discussed
below, this is already accounted for in the repayment probability through the collateral-




9In equilibrium, the lending rate is also the same across borrowers; we therefore econ-
omize on notation by using a lending that is independent of .
14borrower, .10 “Raw” collateral consists therefore of the physical assets of
the ﬁrm and  measures the degree of credit market imperfections.11
The fourth term, , represents the reserve requirements held at the
central bank and returned to the bank at the end of the period (prior to its
closure). The term (1 + 
 ) represents repayment of deposits (principal
and interest) by the bank. The term (1 + 
 ) represents the value of
shares redeemed to households and dividend payments. The term (
 )22
captures the cost associated with transacting in government bonds (dealer
commissions, etc.); for tractability, this cost is assumed to be quadratic.
The linear term  captures the cost associated with issuing shares
(cost of underwriting, issuing brochures, etc.). By contrast, the last term,
2( 
 )12, captures the view that maintaining a positive capital buﬀer
generates some beneﬁts–it represents a signal that the bank’s ﬁnancial po-
sition is strong, and reduces the intensity of regulatory scrutiny, which in
turn reduces the pecuniary cost associated with the preparation of data and
documents required by the supervision authority.12 We assume that this ef-
fect on expected proﬁts is concave, which implies that the beneﬁts of capital
buﬀers diminish fairly rapidly over time.13
The maximization problem is subject, from (20) and (22), to the loan
10Because ﬁrms are ex ante homogenous, the bank has no screening problems; ex post
monitoring costs are captured implicitly by deﬁning  as the “eﬀective” value of collateral
(that is, net of monitoring and contract enforcement costs) that can be seized in case of
default.
11Note that although revenues depend on whether the borrower repays or not, payments
of principal and interest to households and the central bank are not contingent on shocks
occuring during period  and beyond and on ﬁrms defaulting or not. Note also that in case
of default the bank can seize only collateral,  (valued at the economy-wide price of
the ﬁnal good, ) not realized output (valued at the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intermediate price, ).
This is important because it implies that ﬁrm ,w h i c ht a k e s as given when setting its
price, does not internalize the possibility of default. See Agénor, Bratsiotis, and Pfajfar
(2009) for the alternative (and more complex) case.
12Because required capital depends on risk-weighted assets, this term accounts for a
scale eﬀect as well. A related argument–in a stochastic environment–is provided in
Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina (2004), in which capital buﬀers reduce the probability of not
complying with capital requirements.
13Because costs asssociated with issuing capital are modeled linearly, assuming that the
beneﬁt associated with capital buﬀe r si sq u a d r a t i cw o u l di m p l yap r o ﬁt-maximizing value
of  
 equal to inﬁnity. A more general speciﬁcation would be to assume that the beneﬁts
associated with capital buﬀers have a convex-concave shape, but this is much less tractable
numerically.

















the balance sheet constraint (26), used to substitute out 
 ,t h ee q u a t i o n
deﬁning  (27), and the capital requirement constraint (30).
The bank internalizes the fact that the demand for loans (supply of de-
posits) depends negatively (positively) on the lending (deposit) rate, as im-
plied by (9) and (34), and that changes in the level of loans aﬀects capital
requirements, as implied by (30). It also takes the repayment probability of
ﬁrms, the value of collateral, the contract enforcement cost, prices and the
reﬁn a n c er a t ea sg i v e n .
The ﬁrst-order conditions for maximization yield:
− − [(1 + 
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Let  =( 
 )
  denote the constant interest elasticity of the


















which shows that the equilibrium deposit rate is set as a markup over the
reﬁnance rate, adjusted (downward) for the implicit cost of holding reserve
requirements.
Similarly, let  =[ Φ
 ](
 
 ) denote the interest elasticity of the



















16which implies that the gross lending rate depends negatively on the repay-
ment probability, and positively on a weighted average of the marginal cost
of borrowing from the central bank (at the gross rate 
 )a n dt h et o t a lc o s t
of issuing equity, which accounts for both the gross rate of return to be paid
to investors and issuing costs. Weights on each component of funding costs
are measured in terms of the share of equity in proportion of loans.
Now, we assume that the repayment probability 
 depends positively on
three sets of factors. First, it depends on borrowers’ net worth; it increases
with the eﬀective collateral provided by ﬁrms, , and falls with the
amount borrowed, 
 .14 As argued by Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991),
Bester (1994), and Hainz (2003), by increasing borrowers’ eﬀort and reducing
their incentives to take on excessive risk, collateral reduces moral hazard and
raises the repayment probability. Second, we assume that 
 depends on
the cyclical position of the economy, as measured by ˜  ,w i t h˜  denoting
the steady-state value of aggregate output. This term captures the view,
that in periods of high (low) levels of activity, proﬁts and cash ﬂows tend to
improve (deteriorate) and incentives to default diminish (increase). Third, we
assume that 
 increases with the bank’s capital relative to the outstanding
amount of loans, 
 
 , because bank capital (irrespective of whether it
is required by regulation or chosen discretionarily) increases incentives for
the bank to screen and monitor its borrowers. In turn, greater monitoring
mitigates the risk of default and induces lenders (if marginal monitoring costs
are not prohibitive) to reduce the cost of borrowing. As noted earlier, this
is consistent with the evidence in Hubbard et al. (2002), according to which
well-capitalized banks tend to charge lower loan rates than banks with low
capital, and the results in Coleman et al. (2002), in which capital-constrained
banks charge higher spreads on their loans. This eﬀect is also consistent with
the evidence in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), based on cross-country
regressions for 107 industrial and developing countries, which suggests that
all else equal capital requirements are associated with a lower share of non-
performing loans in total assets (which could reﬂect better screening and
monitoring of loan applicants).15
14In standard Stiglitz-Weiss fashion, the repayment probability could be made a de-
creasing function of the lending rate itself, as a result of adverse selection and moral
hazard eﬀects on the riskiness of the pool of borrowers.
15Another rationale for a negative link between the bank capital-credit ratio and the
repayment probability could result from the fact that investors, while increasing their
holdings of bank debt, may exert pressure on the bank to increase proﬁts. Given that

















with   0 ∀.16 Note that although we use a “quasi-reduced form” for
the repayment probability, the impact of collateralizable net worth can be
explicitly derived as in Agénor and Aizenman (1998), under the assumption
that the distribution of the supply shock  is uniform.
Combining (40) and (41) yields the following partial equilibrium result:
Result 1. An increase in bank capital (in proportion of outstanding
loans), by increasing incentives to monitor borrowers, reduces borrowers’ de-
fault probability and lowers the lending rate.











which is increasing in the bond rate and decreasing in the marginal cost of
funds.











which shows that an increase in the direct or indirect cost of issuing equity
(
 or ) reduces excess capital, whereas an increase in  raises excess
capital. Note that required capital, by aﬀecting the cost of issuing equity, has
an indirect eﬀect on the capital buﬀer: an increase in  
 ,b yr a i s i n g
 will
lower excess capital. In that sense, there is some degree of substitutability
between required and excess capital.
From (43), (30), and (31), it can be seen that, a drop in aggregate out-
put, due to a common negative productivity shock, aﬀects the repayment
the bank has a perfectly elastic supply of credit, the only way to do so is to stimulate the
demand for loans by reducing the lending rate–and this can happen only if the repayment
probability increases. However, in this interpretation, the negative link between these two
variables would reﬂect greater risk taking and reckless lending, rather than improved
monitoring, as emphasized in the text.
16We assume that 0 is such that the condition 
 ∈ (01) holds continuously.
18probability through several channels. First, because the demand for labor
(and thus bank loans) falls, the collateral-loan ratio rises initially; this tends
to increase the repayment probability and to lower the lending rate. Sec-
ond, the fall in cyclical output tends to lower the repayment probability and
to raise the lending rate. These two (conﬂicting) eﬀects operate in either
regulatory regime. Third, although bank capital-loan ratio does not change
under a Basel I-type regime (given that risk weights are ﬁxed), it may either
increase or fall under a Basel II-regime, because the risk weight is now di-
rectly related to the repayment probability–the initial response of which is
ambiguous, due to the conﬂicting eﬀects mentioned earlier. The net, general
equilibrium eﬀect on the repayment probability is thus also ambiguous in
general–and so is the relationship between the degree of procyclicality of
both regimes.
Suppose then that the cyclical output eﬀect dominates the collateral-loan
eﬀect; the repayment probability falls and the lending rate tends to increase.
At the same time, the lower level of loans (which implies lower capital re-
quirements) tends to lower the rate of return on equity to induce households
to reduce their demand for these assets. In turn, the lower equity rate reduces
the loan rate. As long as the risk eﬀect is large enough compared to this cost
eﬀect, the Basel I-type regime mitigates the procyclicality inherent to the
behavior of the repayment probability but does not reverse it. Under the
Basel II-type regime, the initial fall in the repayment probability leads also
to a higher risk weight and larger capital requirements–if actual capital can
increase to reﬂect higher regulatory requirements (as implied by (43))–than
under Basel I. As a result of the larger increase (or smaller reduction) in the
supply of equity, the cost of issuing equity falls by less (or may even increase,
if the eﬀect of the higher risk weight dominates the drop in the amount of
loans) as well; this tends to increase the lending rate by more, thereby mak-
ing the Basel II-type regime more procyclical. This is consistent with the
view held by many observers. Thus, if we deﬁne procyclicality in terms of
the behavior of the repayment probability (in a manner akin to Agénor and
P e r e i r ad aS i l v a( 2 0 0 9 ) ,w h of o c u so nt h er i s kp r e m i u m ) ,w ec a ns u m m a r i z e
this result as follows:17
Result 2. If the cyclical output eﬀect dominates the collateral-loan eﬀect
17In the numerical simulations that we report next, procyclicality could be deﬁned equiv-
alently in terms of the behavior of the lending rate or aggregate output; relative rankings
of the two regimes are the same in response to the shocks that we consider.
19on the repayment probability, and if the fall in that probability is suﬃciently
large, the Basel II-type regime magniﬁes the procyclicality inherent to the
behavior of the credit market.
However, in the model the higher capital-loan ratio also tends to increase
the repayment probability; this will tend to mitigate the initial fall in that
variable. If the sensitivity of the repayment probability to the capital-loan
ratio (as measured by 2)i ss u ﬃciently high, this will tend to make the
Basel II-type regime less procyclical than the Basel I-type regime. This
fundamental ambiguity in the procyclical eﬀects of the Basel II-type regime,
relative to the Basel I-type regime, can be summarized as follows:
Result 3. If there is no bank capital channel (2 =0 ), the Basel II-type
regime is always more procyclical than the Basel I-type regime. If 2  0
and suﬃciently large, the Basel II-type regime may be less procyclical than
the Basel I-type regime.
F i n a l l y ,a tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,a sn o t e de a r l i e r ,t h eb a n kp a y si n t e r e s t
on deposits, redeems equity shares, and repays with interest loans received
from the central bank. There are no retained earnings; the proﬁts that are
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The central bank’s assets consists of holdings of government bonds, 
 ,
loans to the commercial bank, 
 , whereas its liabilities consists of currency
supplied to households and ﬁrms, 
 , and required reserves ; the latter








 +  (45)







 −  (46)
Any income made by the central bank from loans to the commercial bank
is transferred to the government at the end of each period.
Monetary policy is operated by ﬁxing the reﬁnance rate, 
 , and providing
liquidity (at the discretion of the bank) through a standing facility.18 The









)] +  (47)
where ˜  is the steady-state value of the real interest rate on bonds,  ≥ 0 the
central bank’s inﬂation target, and ¯  is the output gap, with ¯  denoting
the frictionless level of aggregate output (that is, corresponding to  =0 ).
Coeﬃcient  ∈ (01) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, and
1 2  0 the relative weights on inﬂation deviations from target and output
growth, respectively, and ln is a serially correlated random shock with zero
mean.
2.6 Government
The government purchases the ﬁnal good and issues nominal riskless one-
period bonds, which are held by the central bank and households. Its budget
constraint is given by
 =( 1+










18In several middle-income countries, as in many industrial countries, the standard
mechanism through which the central bank injects liquidity is through open-market op-
erations of various kinds, aimed at providing suﬃcient cash on average to maintain the
short-term policy interest rate at its target level. Above and beyond that, banks still short
of cash can obtain additional funds at the upper band of a corridor, the discount window,
or a standing facility (typically slightly above the policy rate). Conversely, banks with
excess cash can deposit it at the central bank (at a rate typically below the policy rate).
Our speciﬁcation abstracts from open-market operations and corresponds to a “channel
system” in which deposits held at the central bank earn a zero interest rate (see Berentsen
and Monnet (2007)).
21where  = 
 + 
 + 
 is the outstanding stock of government bonds,
+1 b o n d si s s u e da tt h ee n do fp e r i o d +1 ,  real government spending,




−1,c o m e s
from our assumption that all interest income that the central bank makes
(from its lending to the commercial bank and its holdings of government
bonds) is transferred to the government at the end of each period.
Government purchases are assumed to be a constant fraction of output
of ﬁnal goods:
 =  (49)
where  is bounded between zero and one and is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-
order autoregressive process of the form
ln =  ln−1 + 

  (50)
where  ∈ (01) and 






assumed to be independent of each other.
3 Symmetric Equilibrium
In what follows we will assume that the government equilibrates its budget by
adjusting lump-sum taxes, while keeping the overall stock of bonds constant
at ¯ , and that the central bank also keeps its stock of bonds constant at ¯ .
P r i v a t eh o l d i n g so fg o v e r n m e n tb o n d sa r et h u se q u a lt o
 = ¯ − ¯  −
 .
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms producing intermediate goods are
identical. Thus,  = ,  = ,  = ,  = , for all  ∈ (01).A l l
ﬁrms also produce the same output, all households supply the same hours of
labour, and prices are the same across ﬁrms. In the steady state, inﬂation is
constant at ˜ .
Equilibrium conditions must also be satisﬁed for the credit, deposit,
goods, and cash markets.19 Because the supply of loans by the bank, and
the supply of deposits by households, are perfectly elastic at the prevailing
interest rates, the markets for loans and deposits always clear. For equilib-
r i u mi nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t sw er e q u i r et h a tp r o d u c t i o nb ee q u a lt oa g g r e g a t e
19By Walras’ Law, the equilibrium condition of the market for government bonds can
be eliminated.
22demand, that is, using (21),20








Equation (5) can be rewritten as
 = +1 − (1 − ) + Γ(+1 ) (52)
Combining (49), (51), and (52), the aggregate resource constraint then
takes the form
½









 = ++1−(1−)+Γ(+1 ) (53)













 denotes ﬁrms’ total holdings
of cash. Suppose that bank loans to ﬁrms are made only in the form of cash;
we therefore have 
 = 
 .21 The equilibrium condition of the market for
currency is thus given by 
 = 
 + 










Using (26) to eliminate 
 in the above expression yields








Using (8) and (9) and aggregating, condition (54) becomes
¯  + 

















which can be solved for 
 .
As noted earlier, households take portfolio allocation decisions for period
+1at the end of period . Bank equity is thus priced so that its net return
20Implicit in (51) is the assumption that ex post bank monitoring (that is, in case of
default) does not entail real costs.
21As discussed by Agénor and Alper (2009), condition (54) below does not change if
instead the counterpart to loans consists of deposits.
23at  +1equals its expected return at  for  +1 , which consists–given that
there are no capital gains, the bank lasting only on period–of expected bank










Finally, the equilibrium condition of the bank equity market is obtained








4 Steady State and Log-Linearization
The steady-state of the model is derived in Appendix A. With a zero inﬂation
target  =0 , the steady-state inﬂation rate is also ˜  =0 . In addition to
standard results (the steady-state value of the marginal cost, for instance, is
given by ( − 1)), the steady-state value of the repayment probability is
˜ 
 = 0(
 ˜  ˜ 
˜  )
1(
˜  ˜ 
˜  )
2




































From these equations it can be shown that ˜   ˜ .T h er e a s o nw h y ˜  
˜  =˜  is because holding equity is subject to a cost; from the perspective
of the household, the rate of return on equity must therefore compensate for
that and exceed the rate of return on government bonds or physical capital.
Of course, when Θ =0 ,t h e n˜  =˜  =˜ .22 In addition, from (42),
22Thus, the arbitrage condition in Aguiar and Drumond (2007) between the rates of
return on equity and physical capital holds only when Θ =0 .
24the steady-state stock of bonds held by the bank is zero, given that ˜  =˜ .
Equation (43) determines ˜  . Because˜   ˜ , ˜    0,g i v e nt h a t  0.
By implication of (31), ˜  =1under both Basel I (by assumption) and Basel
II.
To analyze how the economy responds to shocks we proceed in standard
fashion by log-linearizing it around a nonstochastic, zero-inﬂation steady
state. The log-linearized equations are summarized in Appendix B. In par-
ticular, log-linearizing condition (24) yields the familiar form of the New




)c  + +1
where c  is the log-deviation of  from its steady-state level, given by









 and ˆ 
 denote percentage point deviations of the lending rate
and the rental rate of capital from their steady-state levels, and ˆ  the log-
deviation of the real wage from its steady-state value. Because changes in
bank capital aﬀect the repayment probability and the lending rate, they will
also aﬀect the behavior of real marginal costs.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
To calibrate the model we dwell as much as possible on Agénor and Alper
(2009); we therefore refer to that study for a detailed discussion of some of our
choices. In addition, for some of the parameters that are “new” or speciﬁct o
this study, we consider alternative values. This is the case, in particular, for
the elasticity of the repayment probability with respect to bank capital, and
the elasticity of the risk weight with respect to the repayment probability,
given their importance for the issue at stake.
Parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The discount factor  is set
at 095, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 5 percent. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ,i s06, in line with estimates for
middle-income countries (see Agénor and Montiel (2008)). The preference
parameters for leisure, , and for composite monetary assets, ,a r eb o t h
set at 15. The share parameter in the index of money holdings, ,w h i c h
25corresponds to the relative share of cash in narrow money, is set at 02.T h e
adjustment cost parameter for equity holdings, Θ, is set at 03,w h e r e a st h e
adjustment cost for investment, Θ, is set at 86. The share of capital in
output of intermediate goods, 1 − ,i ss e ta t035, whereas the elasticity of
demand for intermediate goods, , is set at 10–implying a steady-state value
of the markup rate, ( − 1),e q u a lt o111 percent. The adjustment cost
parameter for prices, ,i ss e ta t745. The rate of depreciation of capital
is set at 60 percent. The reserve requirement rate  is set at 01,w h e r e a s
the coeﬃcient of the lagged value is set at  =0(which therefore implies
that we abstract from persistence stemming from the central bank’s policy
response). We also set 1 =1 5 and 2 =0 2, which are conventional values
for Taylor-type rules for middle-income countries; the relatively low value of
2 (compared to estimates for industrial countries, which are closer to 05)
is consistent with the evidence reported for Latin America by Moura and
Carvalho (2009). For the degree of persistence of supply and demand shocks,
we assume that  =  =0 6, with standard deviations  =0 02 and
 =0 03, respectively.
For the parameters characterizing bank behavior, we assume that the
eﬀective collateral-loan ratio, ,i s02. The elasticity of the repayment prob-
ability with respect to collateral is set at 1 =0 05, with respect to the
bank capital-loan ratio at 2 =0 01, and with respect to cyclical output at
3 =0 2. In the case of 2, we also consider an alternative value of 2 =0 2.
Although somewhat arbitrary (as far as we know, there is not much empir-
ical evidence about this parameter for middle-income countries), these two
diﬀerent values allow us to explore the extent to which procyclical eﬀects
diﬀer across regulatory regimes. The elasticity of the risk weight under Basel
II with respect to the repayment probability is set at a relatively low value,
 =0 05. The cost parameters , ,a n d are also set at low values,
005, 01,a n d0001, respectively. The capital adequacy ratio, , is set at
008, which corresponds to the target value for Basel I and the ﬂoor value for
Basel II. Finally, the steady-state value of the risk weight 
 is calibrated
so that it is equal to unity under both regimes. For Basel I, given that the
risk weight is constant, this choice also implies that it remains continuously
equal to unity.
266 Procyclical Eﬀects of Regulatory Regimes
We now consider the procyclical eﬀects–as measured by the behavior of the
repayment probability–of two types of shocks: a negative productivity (or
supply) shock, and a negative (or demand) shock to the share of govern-
ment spending in output.23 In each case, we report the result for the two
diﬀerent values of the elasticity of the repayment probability with respect to
the capital-loan ratio (2 =0 01 and 2 =0 2). As is made clear below,
this parameter change allows us to illustrate the ambiguity in the procyclical
eﬀects of the two regulatory regimes.
6.1 Negative Productivity Shock
Figures 1 and 2 shows the impulse response functions of some of the main
variables of the model following a temporary, one percentage point negative
shock to productivity. The results show indeed that two diﬀerent outcomes
may occur, depending on the elasticity of the repayment probability with
respect to the capital-loan ratio, 2.I nb o t hﬁgures, the behavior of most of
the variables (except for marginal costs) does not diﬀer much across regimes.
This is because of the negative relation between the capital buﬀer and re-
quired capital, as implied by (43); as a result, total capital under the two
regimes is more closely related.24
T h ed i r e c te ﬀect of the shock is to lower temporarily the rental rate of
capital, which reduces investment and tends to reduce marginal production
costs. However, because the increase in borrowing costs (as discussed below)
dominates, real marginal costs go up, thereby raising inﬂation.25 The policy
23Note that we do not compare the results under either regulatory regime with the case
where there is no bank capital channel (that is,  =0∀). As is made clear below, the
main factor that makes the Basel II-type regime diﬀer from the Basel I-type regime is the
endogeneity of the risk weight in the former. This channel disappears if there is no bank
capital. Hence, in that case, we would expect the convergence path to be similiar to what
happens under the Basel I-type regime. However, because the steady-state level of the
repayment probability would be lower in the absence of bank capital, the lending rate and
real wages would be higher and aggregate output would be lower compared to what we
obtain under that regime.
24However, by changing the parameters by more, we could magnify these diﬀerences.
25Note that, with our cost-of-price-adjustment assumption, IG producers are actually
free to reset nominal prices every period, in contrast to Calvo-style speciﬁcation of price
stickiness.
27rate, which is determined by a Taylor rule, rises in response to the increase
in prices. By and large, other interest rates in the economy tend to follow
t h er i s ei nt h ep o l i c yr a t e . 26 The rise in the expected real bond rate induces
intertemporal substitution in consumption toward the future, which trans-
lates into a drop in current spending by households. Because government
spending is a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no fo u t p u t ,i tf a l l si m m e d i a t e l yi nr e s p o n s et o
the adverse shock to aggregate supply. The net eﬀect on aggregate demand
is thus negative as well.
The initial drop in output also lowers the repayment probability directly,
whereas the collateral-loan ratio tends to increase at ﬁrst–thereby raising
the repayment probability. The net eﬀect of these two channels is therefore
ambiguous in general; given our calibration, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and
the repayment probability falls, thereby raising the lending rate and marginal
costs. In addition, however, there is a third channel in the model, which
operates through the bank capital-loan ratio and depends on the regulatory
regime. Under Basel I, the bank capital-loan ratio does not change by much,
because excess capital changes very little (given our calibration) and, by
deﬁnition, the risk weight  is constant. There is therefore a negligible
indirect eﬀect on the repayment probability under this regime. By contrast,
under Basel II, the initial drop in the repayment probability raises the risk
weight and therefore actual and required capital. Because credit falls, the
bank capital-loan ratio rises unambiguously, which implies an upward eﬀect
on the repayment probability, thereby mitigating the initial downward eﬀect
under that regime. The net eﬀect is thus ambiguous in general and depends
on the value of 2. In Figure 1, which corresponds to 2 =0 01,t h es h o c k
lead to the conventional case where Basel II is more procyclical than Basel
I, whereas in Figure 2, which corresponds to 2 =0 2, the opposite occurs.
Thus, Basel II can be less procyclical than Basel I–in the sense that the
drop in the repayment probability, the increase in the lending rate, and the
fall in output, are all of a smaller magnitude.
26By itself, the reduction in the demand for loans and capital requirements puts down-
ward pressure on the rate of return on equity; however, given that the bond rate increases
quite signiﬁcantly, the rate of return on equity ends up increasing to mitigate the drop in
the demand for equity.
286.2 Negative Government Spending Shock
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions associated with a tem-
porary, one percentage point reduction in the share of government spending
in output. In both cases the reduction in the government spending share
raises the proportion of output going to household consumption. This lowers
immediately the marginal utility of consumption and reduces on impact the
supply of labor. As a result, real wages increase initially and output falls.
The policy rate falls as well, thereby lowering the deposit rate and thus the
bond rate–which in turn stimulates private current consumption, by induc-
ing households to shift consumption toward the present. However, due to
the relatively low intertemporal elasticity of substitution in our calibration,
this oﬀsetting eﬀect is only partial; aggregate demand falls on impact, albeit
by less than public spending.
The fall in aggregate supply resul t sf r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e a le ﬀective
cost of labor, due not only to an increase in wages (alluded to earlier), but also
from a higher lending rate–which itself stems from the fact that, despite the
fall in the policy rate, the repayment probability falls in both regimes. Indeed,
although the drop in bank borrowing raises the collateral-debt ratio (thereby
exerting upward pressure on the repayment probability), the downward eﬀect
due to the fall in output dominates. The increase in eﬀective labor costs leads
to higher marginal costs (despite a reduction in the cost of capital), and this
exerts upward pressure on inﬂation, which increases in both regimes when
Basel II is more procyclical (Figure 3), and in Basel I, when Basel II is
less procyclical (Figure 4). In the latter case, in the Basel II regime, inﬂation
actually falls because the repayment probability falls by less, and the increase
in the lending rate is smaller; as a result, the “cost channel” is not as strong,
in contrast to the other cases. The increase in the marginal product of labor
dominates the increase in the cost of working capital, which leads to a fall in
inﬂation.
A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 also shows that, depending on the elas-
ticity of the repayment probability with respect to the capital-loan ratio, 2,
the repayment probability may drop by less under Basel II. The reason is
the same as before–under Basel II, the initial fall in the repayment prob-
ability leads to a higher risk weight, which increases the bank capital-loan
ratio and thereby mitigates the initial downward pressure on that probability
associated with changes in the collateral-loan ratio and output. In Figure
3, which corresponds to 2 =0 01, the shock generates the “conventional”
29result, whereas in Figure 4, which corresponds to 2 =0 2, Basel II is less
procyclical than Basel I—whether this is measured in terms of the behavior
of the repayment probability, the lending rate, or aggregate output.
In addition, the increase in the lending rate may, or may not, be larger
under Basel II. This is because the (downward) response of the policy rate
is weaker under Basel I (given that inﬂation drops less under that regime),
but the drop in the repayment probability may or may not dominate. If
movements in the policy rate and the repayment probability tend to oﬀset
each other, the lending rate mat not change by much under Basel II. This
pattern also explain diﬀerences in the behavior of the rate of return on equity
under the two regimes. The larger increase in the lending rate (and thus the
marginal cost of the labor) under Basel I explains why aggregate output may
contract more under that regime, despite higher consumption under Basel II.
Marginal costs may also fall by more under Basel II, which in turn accounts
for the larger drop in inﬂation under that regime.
7 Summary and Extensions
In this paper the business cycle eﬀects of bank capital requirements were ex-
amined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections, a cost
channel of monetary policy, and a perfectly elastic supply of liquidity by the
central bank at the prevailing policy rate. In the model, which combines
elements developed in Agénor and Alper (2009) and Agénor and Pereira da
Silva (2009), Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are deﬁned. In
the latter case, the risk weight is related directly to the repayment probabil-
ity that is embedded in the loan rate that the bank imposes on borrowers.
A “bank capital channel” is introduced by assuming that higher levels of
capital (relative to the amount of loans) induce banks to screen and monitor
borrowers more carefully, thereby reducing the risk of default and increas-
ing the repayment probability. The model is calibrated for a middle-income
country. Numerical simulations show that, in the absence of the bank cap-
ital channel, a Basel II-type regime is always more procyclical than a Basel
I-type regime, as in the conventional, partial equilibrium view. By contrast,
if the elasticity of the repayment probability to the bank capital-loan ratio is
suﬃciently high, a Basel II-type regime may be less procyclical than a Basel
I-type regime, in response to contractionary supply and demand shocks. The
key reason is that, following a negative supply shock for instance, the bank
30capital channel mitigates the drop in the repayment probability, due to an
increased monitoring incentive eﬀect.
T h ea n a l y s i si nt h i sp a p e rc a nb ee x t e n d e di nav a r i e t yo fd i r e c t i o n s .F i r s t ,
the assumption that the bank lasts only one period allowed us to avoid any
distinction between stocks and ﬂows in the dynamics of bank capital. A use-
ful extension would be to consider an explicit link between (ﬂow) dividends
and banks’ net worth, as for instance in Meh and Moran (2008) and Valencia
(2008). This would enrich the dynamics of the model, because changes in
banks’ net worth would aﬀect price-setting behavior and the real economy.
Second, it could be assumed that the central bank might choose a monetary
policy that mitigates economic ﬂuctuations arising from capital requirements.
T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h eo b j e c t i v eo fp r u d e n t i a ls u p e r v i s i o nm i g h tb ei nc o n ﬂict
with the goal of maintaining high and stable growth. For instance, Cecchetti
and Li (2008) have shown (in their speciﬁcf r a m e w o r k )t h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et o
derive an optimal monetary policy that reinforces prudential capital require-
ments and at the same time stabilizes aggregate economic activity. Further
research, however, is needed to determine the optimal monetary policy in the
Basel II framework.
Third, by adding an objective of ﬁnancial stability in the central bank’s
loss function (or by adding explicitly a regulator with the same objective),
the model could be used to examine several recent policy proposals aimed at
strengthening the ﬁnancial system and at encouraging more prudent lending
behavior in upturns. Indeed, several observers have argued that by raising
capital requirements in a countercyclical way, regulators could help to choke
oﬀ asset price bubbles–such as the one that developed in the US housing
market–before the party really got out of hand. Counter-cyclical bank pro-
visions have already been used for some time in countries such as Spain and
Portugal. The Spanish system, for instance, requires higher provisions when
credit grows more than the historical average, thus linking provisioning to
the credit and business cycle. This discourages (although it does not elim-
inate) excessive lending in booms while strengthening banks for bad times.
A more recent proposal has been put forward by Goodhart and Persaud
(2008) and involves essentially adjusting the Basel II capital requirements
to take into account the relevant point in the economic cycle. In partic-
ular, in the Goodhart-Persaud proposal, the capital adequacy requirement
on mortgage lending would be linked to the rise in both mortgage lending
31and house prices.27 However, there are several potential problems with this
type of rules. For instance, the introduction of counter-cyclical provisions
in Spain was facilitated by the fact that the design of accounting rules falls
under the authority of the Central Bank of Spain. But accounting rules in
many other countries do not readily accept the concept of expected losses,
on which the Spanish system is based, preferring instead to focus on ac-
tual losses–information that is more relevant for short-term investors. This
raises therefore the question of redesigning accounting principles in ways that
balance the short-term needs of investors with those of individual-bank and
systemic banking-sector stability.
From the perspective of the appropriate design of countercyclical bank
capital requirements rules, however, a pressing task in our view is to eval-
uate carefully their welfare implications. Zhu (2008) is one of the few con-
tributions that focuses on this issue, but he does so in a setting that is
more appropriate for industrial economies. In the context of middle-income
countries, where credit (as is the case here) plays a critical role in ﬁnanc-
ing short-term economic activity, an across-the-board rule could entail some
serious welfare costs. At the same time, of course, to the extent that they
succeed in reducing ﬁnancial volatility, and the risk of full-blown crises, they
may also enhance welfare. A key issue therefore is to determine the net ben-
eﬁts of countercyclical bank capital rules. Our belief is that this issue can
be fruitfully addressed by extending the existing model to account explicitly
for systemic ﬁnancial stability.
27Goodhart and Persaud argue that their proposal could be introduced under the so-
called “Second Pillar” of Basel 2. Unlike Pillar I, which consists of rules for requiring
minimum capital against credit, operational and market risks, Pillar II is supposed to take




Given the parameter values, the steady-state values of all endogenous
variables (denoted by tildes) are calculated by dropping all time subscripts
from the relevant equations. Endogenous variables would converge to these
values if the system is not disturbed by shocks.
From (47), with ∆ln ˜  =0 ,
˜ 
 =˜  +˜  + 1(˜  − 
) (A1)
We require inﬂation to be equal to its target value in the steady state:
˜  = 
 (A2)
Substituting this result in (A1) yields therefore the steady-state value of
the reﬁnance rate:
˜ 
 =˜  +˜  (A3)
We will focus in what follows on the case where  =0 ,s ot h a t˜  =0 .
The steady-state value of the bond rate is determined by setting  = +1
and ˜  =0in (6),
˜ 
 =˜  =˜ 
 = 
−1 − 1 (A4)







2 ˜  =0  (A5)
Substituting this result in (5) yields
˜  =  ˜  (A6)
Substituting (A5) in (10) gives
−1+(˜ 
 +1− )=0 






− (1 − ) (A7)
33which is also equal to ˜  if ˜  =0 , as implied by (A3).
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2 (A9)















which is the same for Basel I and Basel II, given the assumption that ˜  is
also equal to unity under Basel I.
From (8), (9), and (14), the household’s demand for real cash balances,
bank deposits, and equity are
˜ 
 =
 ˜ 1(1 +˜ )
˜   (A11)
˜  =
(1 − ) ˜ 1(1 +˜ )
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1+˜  ) (A13)
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−1 − 1 (A17)
34which implies, given that ˜  0,t h a t˜   ˜ , as discussed in the text.





From (18), steady-state output of intermediate goods is given by
˜  =  ˜ 
1− ˜ 
 (A19)













˜  ˜ 
(1 +˜ ) ˜ 









(1 +˜ )˜ 
˜  ]
Substituting (A4) and (A7) in this expression, and solving for ˜  with







˜ (1 +˜ )
 (A20)
The steady-state level of borrowing from the bank is thus
˜ 
 = ˜ ˜  ˜  (A21)
From (21), and with ˜  =0(so that ˜  =1 ), price adjustment costs are
zero in the steady state ( =0 ). From the price adjustment equation
(24),
























35From (42) and (43), and using (A4), the steady-state values of the bank’s












−1 − 1 − (˜  + )
¾2
 (A24)
where, from (30) and (31), assuming that under Basel I the constant risk
weight is also equal to unity,
˜ 





 =1  (A25)
From (A24) and(A25), total capital can be calculated as
˜  = ˜ 
 + ˜ 
 (A26)
From (29) and (A23), the steady-state level of the bank’s borrowing from
the Central bank is
˜ 
 = ˜ 
 − (1 − )˜  ˜  − ˜  ˜  (A27)
The equilibrium condition of the goods market, equation (51) yields the
steady-state condition ˜  = ˜  + ˜  + ˜ , which can be rearranged, using (A6)
and (49), to give
(1 − )˜  = ˜  +  ˜  (A28)
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This equation can be solved for ˜ . Given that the overall stock of bonds
¯  is also constant, and that ˜  =0 , household holdings of government
bonds are given by
¯ 
 = ¯  − ¯ 
 (A30)
From (48) and (49), the steady-state value of lump-sum tax to households
is thus







Based on the results of Appendix A, the log-linearized equations of the
model are presented below. Variables with a hat denote percentage point
deviations of the related variables for interest rates and inﬂation, and log-
deviations for the others, from steady-state levels.28
From the ﬁrst-order conditions from household optimization, equations
(6) and (8), private consumption is driven by
 ˆ +1 = ˆ  + (ˆ 

 − +1) (B1)
where +1 is deﬁned as, given that ˜  =0 ,
+1 =  ˆ +1 − ˆ  (B2)
















By using the steady-state value of cash balances from (A14), equation
































From (14) and (A16), the demand for equity is












which can be used to determine the behavior of ˆ 
 .
28Net interest rates are thus used as approximations of the log gross interest rates.
37The Fisher equation, deﬁned in (10), yields
(1+)ˆ 

+1 +Θ( ˆ +2 − ˆ +1)−Θ( ˆ +1 − ˆ )−ˆ 

 ++1 =0 
(B7)
which can be used to determine the behavior of ˆ 
 .
From (7), labor supply is




 ˜ 1 ˆ 
˜ 

that is, using (A18),
ˆ  =(
 ˜ 1




From (22), labor demand can be derived as
ˆ  = ˆ  −ˆ 







A log-linear approximation around the steady state of the price adjust-




)c  + +1 (B10)
where, using (23),







 − ˆ  (B11)
From the production function (18), output of intermediate goods is
ˆ  = ˆ  +( 1− ) ˆ  +  ˆ  (B12)
































































Thus, (B14) corresponds to (B15) with ˆ 

 =0 .
From (41), the linearized equation for the probability of repayment is
ˆ 





 + 3ˆ  (B16)
where the term 2ˆ 

 o nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo ft h i se x p r e s s i o nd r o p so u tf o r
Basel I.
From (47), the central bank policy rate is determined by
ˆ 

 = ˆ 

−1 + 1ˆ  + 2ˆ  (B17)
Firms’ demand for credit is, from (20),
ˆ 

 = ˆ  +ˆ  + ˆ .( B 1 8 )




 = ˆ  +
(1 +˜ )ˆ 
 − (1 +˜ )ˆ 







 − (1 +˜ )ˆ 
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 = ˆ 

 − ˆ  (Basel I) (B21)
ˆ 

 = ˆ 

 − ˆ  +ˆ 

  (Basel II) (B22)
For the risk weight under Basel II, linearization of (31) yields
ˆ 

 = −ˆ 

  (B23)













39which can then be substituted in (B6) to determine ˆ 
 .
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Equation (B25) can be solved for ˆ 
 .
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43Figure 1 
Negative Productivity Shock 
Basel II more Procyclical than Basel I 




Note: Interest rates, inflation rate and the repayment probability are measured in absolute 
deviations, that is, in the relevant graphs, a value of 0.05 for these variables corresponds to a 5 percentage 
point deviation in absolute terms. Figure 1 (Continued) 
Negative Productivity Shock  
Basel II more Procyclical than Basel I 





 Figure 2 
Negative Productivity Shock 
Basel II less Procyclical than Basel I 




Note: See note to Figure 1. Figure 2 (Continued) 
Negative Productivity Shock 
Basel II less Procyclical than Basel I 





 Figure 3 
Negative Government Spending Shock 
Basel II more Procyclical than Basel I 




Note: See note to Figure 1. 
 Figure 3 (Continued) 
Negative Government Spending Shock 
Basel II more Procyclical than Basel I 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
 
 
 Figure 4 
Negative Government Spending Shock  
Basel II less Procyclical than Basel I 




Note: See note to Figure 1. 
 Figure 4 (Continued) 
Negative Government Spending Shock 
Basel II less Procyclical than Basel I 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
 
 